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of transfers, we express individual risk level in terms of Bonacich measure. We
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sharing may reduce risk taking. We also provide conditions under which agents
under or over invest with respect to the risk allocation maximizing the sum of
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1 Introduction
In many economic contexts, a redistribution of incomes in a society of risk averse agents
affects risk taking. For instance, in labor markets, unemployment insurance encourages
workers to seek higher productivity jobs because they are more willing to endure the
possibility of unemployment; similarly, redistributive taxation enhances entrepreneur-
ship1. Hence, the general message is that social insurance enhances individual risk
taking. The conclusion is of sizeable importance, since it has an impact on innovation
and growth.
This article revisits this issue in a context of heterogenous risk sharing and strategic
interactions. A typical example is that of a small economy, say a developing village, in
which agents insure themselves against risk by sharing revenues2. First, strategic inter-
actions can emerge from the sharing of correlated incomes. Second, informal insurance
may be heterogenous across agents. For instance, if there is no formal institution to
enforce a redistribution mechanism, heterogeneity in risk sharing may arise because
of self-enforcing mechanisms and trust (for instance social sanctions may be heteroge-
nous), and also the heterogeneity in information flows and moral hazard, in income
correlations, in geographic costs, increasing costs to group size, etc.
The main objective of this article is to examine how risk sharing heterogeneity affects
individual incentives to take risk. To proceed, we consider a society of risk-averse
agents. Each agent has one unit to invest in a specific project. Projects are developed
1See Acemoglu and Shimer [1999, 2000], Mayshar [1977], Kanbur [1981], Zeira [1988], Boadway et
al. [1991], Sinn [1996], Garcia-Penalosa and Wen [2008].
2Townsend (1994) emphasizes the importance of informal insurance networks in Indian villages;
similarly, Udry (1994) documents that the majority of transfers take place between neighbors and
relatives in Northern Nigeria - see also Rosenzweig (1988), Murgai et al. (2002), Fafchamps and Lund
(2003), Dercon and De Weerdt (2006), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), De Weerdt and Fafchamps
(2007). Recent theoretical advances about risk sharing in developing economics have studied the
impact of the structure of the social insurance networks on the volume of transfers, whether rules are
self-enforcing (Ambrus et al. (2007), Bloch et al. (2007, 2008)) or not (Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2006,
2007), and Gallegati et al. (2008)). With regard to this theoretical literature, our work allows for
endogenous income, and heterogenous transfers across agents.
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through investment in a portfolio of two correlated technologies A and B. We assume
without loss of generality that technology A is more profitable but entails more risk.
After investing, incomes are realized, and then agents proceed to transfers.
As a first key ingredient of our model, we consider mean-variance utility functions,
and we assume that technologies are correlated. Hence, agents are not only exposed to
idiosyncratic factors, but also to systemic factors. In this context, diversification via
resources pooling enables to reduce specific risk.
The second key ingredient concerns the rule of transfers, that we assume exogenous and
binding3. We represent the structure of transfers by a matrix Λ = [λij], where λij rep-
resents the share of agent j’s income that agent j transfers to agent i. To focus on pure
risk sharing and rule out wealth effects4, we assume that expected after-transfer rev-
enues are equal. This assumption implies that the matrix is row-stochastic. Moreover,
it is column-stochastic by budget constraint (in total the matrix is bi-stochastic).
We ask the following questions. How does the heterogeneity of risk sharing drive
individual risk choice? Does more revenue sharing enhance risk taking? Do agents
under-invest or over-invest with respect to what is socially optimal? Last, how does
cash transfers affect the overall investments in the more risky technology?
We first point out that if the excess return of technology A relative to B is positively
(resp. negatively) correlated among agents, risk levels are strategic substitutes (resp.
3The issue of self-enforcement is beyond the scope of this article. Actually, this problem is limited
by two factors in developing countries. First, agents may not exchange their whole income with
neighbors (of course, a self-enforcing mechanism may have designed low-volume transfers). Second,
agents generally know each other for a long time and do not often move during their lives, which
enforces trust and cooperation (social sanction are strong). “For developing countries, most researchers
[...] argue[...] that information and enforcement problems are likely to be small between the members
of a village and this creates a favorable environment for cooperation”, Dercon and De Weerdt (2006).
4Of course, wealth inequality can generate different risk levels; first risk aversion is in general
wealth dependent, and second poor agents may not be able to access all technologies. We study
another mechanism producing differentiated risk levels.
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complements). We then focus on the case of strategic substitutability, which is more
plausible (in particular this is the case if technology B is risk free).
We gradually introduce heterogeneity in income transfers. As a benchmark, we first
examine the (full and partial) equal sharing rule, which stipulates that agents share
equally an identical proportion of their realized incomes. In the polar case in which
projects are not correlated, equal sharing enhances investments in (the higher risk/return)
technology A. Due to correlations between transfers, correlated incomes affect the at-
tractiveness of technology A under risk sharing. We therefore state a condition (con-
dition C0 thereafter) which guarantees that technology A stays more attractive under
full equal sharing, and we assume that this condition holds for the rest of the paper. In
particular, this condition guarantees technology A stays more attractive under partial
equal sharing.
Then we turn to the general case. The transfer matrix can be interpreted as a network,
in which the value of connection ij is the share that agent j gives to agent i. First we
consider the case in which own shares are homogenous. We find that equilibrium risk
levels are homogenous (but not profits) and decreasing in the value of own share. That
is, two transfer matrices with same homogenous own share but different off-diagonal
elements generate the same equilibrium risk profile. Hence, heterogenous risk levels
only emerge from heterogenous own shares.
Second, we examine the case of heterogenous own shares. In general, an optimal risk
profile exists and it is unique. We then separate the space of transfer matrices in
two regions, region R in which risk sharing is weak, region R¯ in which risk sharing
is large. Our main theoretical results concern region R. In this region, risk levels
can be interpreted as a Bonacich measure of a transformation of the transfer matrix5.
Furthermore, with risk sharing, agents take more risk than in isolation. Last, we prove
5This measure has been introduced in Bonacich (1987). Ballester et al. (2006) renewed the idea in
the field of economics. Two recent papers link Bonacich centrality and optimal decisions: see Ghiglino
and Goyal (2008) for a model of a pure exchange economy with a positional good; see Corbo et al.
(2007) and Bramoulle´ et al. (2008) for models of local public goods, Bloch and Que´rou (2008) for a
model of oligopoly with local externalities among consumers. In these latter works, as well as in ours,
actions are strategic substitutes.
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that increasing revenue sharing enhances risk taking, but only in average; typically
certain agents may take less risk.
In region R¯, in which risk sharing is large, simple examples illustrate that more revenue
sharing can reduce the average risk level. Moreover, certain risk level may be lower
that the level of risk taken by an isolated agent. Therefore, a deep conclusion is that
depending on the volume of risk sharing, heterogeneity in risk sharing may affect risk
taking in opposite directions.
Then we focus on weak risk sharing. We examine the tension between individually
optimal risks and the risk profile maximizing the sum of individual payoffs. We first
notice that the game may generate either positive or negative externalities. This arises
from a simple tradeoff: when some agent increases investment in technology A, this
has an ambiguous effect on the profits of agents who will receive some transfer from
her, by raising both expected means and volatility of future transfer.
We first characterize the efficient risk profile as a Bonacich measure defined over a
matrix which aggregates all these externalities. Then we turn to the comparison of
the average equilibrium risk level and the average efficient risk profile. Given that
the sign of externalities is endogenous, agents may either under-invest or over-invest
with respect to social welfare. Actually, agents under-invest (resp. over-invest) in
situations in which they do not internalize that an increase of their risk level would
promote (resp. reduce) significantly the return of technology A for others - because
the induced increase in expected means dominates (resp. is dominated by) the raise
of variance. We do relate the comparison of the average equilibrium risk level and the
average efficient risk profile to conditions on the transfer matrix. We find that if each
agent’s own share is larger than (resp. is lower than) the sum of squares of shares she
transfers to others, then agents under-invest (resp. over-invest) in technology A with
respect to the efficient profile.
Finally, an extension examines the issue of cash transfer or wealth redistribution. We
determine the impact of a modification of initial wealths on the total amount of invest-
ments that the society devotes to technology A. The result has important implications
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for economic policy. As a first illustration, we present a set of matrices for which
the identity of eligible households does not matter. This case happens to be that of
societies with homogenous own shares. In a second application, one agent receives a
positive shock on her initial wealth, for instance as being eligible to cash transfer by
an aid program. We characterize the agent to be selected in order to generate a maxi-
mal increase in the overall investments made in technology A. Typically, agents with
maximal equilibrium risk (before the treatment) or with lowest own share may not be
those to select.
The article is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 studies
the existence and characterization of equilibrium, and some comparative statics. Sec-
tion 5 examines efficiency issue, and section 6 is an extension exploring cash transfer
issue. The last section concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model
We consider a three-stage game in which, first, agents choose their level of risk, second,
incomes are realized, and third agents share simultaneously some part of their revenues.
To fix ideas, consider a village economy, in which risk averse farmers have one unit of
land to use for the plantation of potatoes and strawberries (the latter variety having
higher expected means and being more risky). After planting, incomes are realized and
farmers share some part of their revenues.
Formally, the society contains a finite set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} of agents. Each agent i
has one unit to invest in two technologies A and B. The return Y j of a technology
j ∈ {A,B} is random with expected mean µj and variance σ2j . Agents are risk-averse
and care about expected means and variance of the returns, i.e. the utility of agent
i investing in technology Y j is Ui(Y
j) = E(Y j) − κ
2
V ar(Y j). We suppose that both
technologies are intrinsically attractive, i.e. µj >
κ
2
σ2j for j = A,B. Further, technology
A has greater expected return than technology B and is more risky, that is, µA > µB
and σ2A > σ
2
B (one possible interpretation is that technology A is an innovation). Let
σAB represent the covariance between technologies A and B in a same project. Now
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we define correlations between projects. We let τA (resp. τB) represent the correlation
between a project that uses technology A (resp. B) and a distinct one that uses
technology A (resp. B). Further, τAB is the covariance between technologies A and B
in two different projects. Economically, τA, τB, τAB correspond to systemic risks, while
σAB, σ
2
A, σ
2
B incorporate both specific and systemic risk.
A strategy for agent i is a scalar xi ∈ [0, 1]. It represents the share of investment that
agent i devotes to technology A. The study of corner solutions is beyond the scope of
this article; we obtain solutions in the interval [0, 1] for a large range of parameters.
We interpret xi as the level of risk chosen by agent i. Note that if agents had a binary
choice between A and B, xi ∈ [0, 1] could be interpreted as a probability, and we
would solve a Bayesian equilibrium. Choosing some level xi, agent i selects therefore
technology Yi = xiY
A + (1 − xi)Y B. We let X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) denote a strategy
profile of the society.
To insure against risk, agents share part of their realized incomes with others. In our
setting, the realization of individual incomes is observable by all others. Furthermore,
the sharing rule is exogenous and binding. Transfers are described by a transfer matrix
Λ = [λij], where λij ∈ [0, 1] represents the share of the realized income of agent j that
agent j transfers to agent i. Parameter λii represents agent i’s own share. By budget
constraint, λii+
∑
j 6=i λji = 1 for all i. Furthermore, to isolate risk sharing from wealth
effects, we suppose that ex ante after-sharing revenues are equal. This implies that
own share plus the proportions of revenues that agent i receives from others sum up
to 1, i.e. λii +
∑
j 6=i λij = 1 for all i. Therefore, the matrix Λ is bi-stochastic. This set
of rules encompasses the possibility of ex ante asymmetric bilateral transfers6. Among
all possibilities covered by our setting, a polar case is the egalitarian sharing of realized
incomes7.
6In line with the existence of asymmetric transfers, the redistributive role of transfers has been
emphasized, as in Lucas and Stark (1985) or Azam and Gubert (2006). Recent work on child fostering
focuses on the role of extended family ties as key determinant of insurance against persistent shocks,
such as how to deal with the loss of a parent or husband, like in Duflo (2003) or Ksoll (2007).
7This is for instance the case in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2006, 2007). Interestingly, this particular
rule happens to be the solution of optimal decisions of costless link formation in our model (see remark
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Having defined the matrix of transfers, we relate individual profits to transfers. We
consider a profile of choices X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn). Agent i’s profit writes:
pii(X) =
∑
j
λijE(Yj)− κ
2
∑
j
∑
k
λijλikcov(Yj, Yk) (1)
where
E(Yj) = µAxj + µB(1− xj)
and, letting symbol 1 quote for the indicator function,
cov(Yj, Yk) = xjxk
(
σ2A × 1{j=k} + τA × 1{j 6=k}
)
+
(
xj(1− xk) + xk(1− xj)
)(
σAB × 1{j=k} + τAB × 1{j 6=k}
)
+(1− xj)(1− xk)
(
σ2B × 1{j=k} + τB × 1{j 6=k}
)
3 Equilibrium
We search for the existence and characterization of Nash equilibria. Formally, a pro-
file X∗ is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if it satisfies that, for all i, for all xi ∈ [0, 1],
pii(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≥ pii(xi, x∗−i).
The system of first order equations is linear and writes as:
λiix
∗
i + F
∑
j 6=i
λij · x∗j = H +Kλii (2)
with F = τA+τB−2τAB
σ2A+σ
2
B−2σAB
, H =
µA−µB
κ
+τB−τAB
σ2A+σ
2
B−2σAB
, and K =
σ2B−τB+τAB−σAB
σ2A+σ
2
B−2σAB
. Parameter F ,
which will be of major interest throughout the paper, can be written
cov((A−B)i,(A−B)j)
cov((A−B)i,(A−B)i) ;
that is, F is equal to the ratio of the systemic risk of excess return of A overB to its total
risk. If the excess return of technology A relative to B is positively (resp. negatively)
correlated among agents, risk levels are strategic substitutes (resp. complements). We
assume that F > 0, which is the most plausible case (in particular this is the case when
technology B is risk free).
4 thereafter), and more, this solution is efficient.
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Equation (2) shows that agents take into account correlations between projects. Fur-
ther, as F > 0, individual actions are strategic substitutes, which will be a crucial
feature of our analysis.
We introduce the n × n matrix Γ = [γij], with γii = 0 for all i, and γij = λijλii for all
i, j 6= i. The element γij is equal to the ratio of the share that agent j gives to agent
i over agent i’s own share. It is the matrix of interactions, over which the Bonacich
measure will be defined8.
3.1 Risk sharing with homogenous own shares
We begin with the program of an isolated agent; that is, for all i, j 6= i, λii = 1,
λij = 0. Individual decisions take into account the following factors. First, technology
B is attractive since it is less volatile than technology A. Second, agents are incited
to invest some share in technology A for two reasons: for diversification purpose, i.e.
variance reduction, even if covariance limits diversification, and because technology A
has higher expected return than technology B. These factors shape the optimal level
of risk of agent i, denoted xe∗:
xe∗ =
µA−µB
κ
+ σ2B − σAB
σ2A + σ
2
B − 2σAB
We note that xe∗ = H + K, that we assume positive. And under mild conditions on
the parameters of the game, we have xe∗ ≤ 1. In essence, Markovitz’s message about
diversification is effective, although limited by the covariance of the lotteries.
Let us turn to socialized agents. We consider here the egalitarian sharing of realized
incomes. This corresponds to a transfer matrix ΛFES with λFESij =
1
n
for all i, j (where
‘FES’ quotes for ‘Full Equal Sharing’). Adapting the first order equation (2) to matrix
8The matrix of interaction is the matrix over which the Bonacich measure is defined. This matrix
is a transformation of the initial matrix of bilateral cross effects. In our game, the matrix of cross
effects is Λ and the matrix of interaction is Γ. Technically, the transformation of our game echoes
that was introduced in Ballester et al. (2006), remark 2 pp. 1409.
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ΛFES and solving, we obtain
xFES =
nH +K
1 + (n− 1)F (3)
We denote ∆µc = κ
[
(σ2A−σ2B)τAB+(τB−τA)σAB+σ2BτA−σ2AτB
(σ2A−τA)+(σ2B−τB)−2(σAB−τAB)
]
. The following condition will
be useful:
Condition C0 µA − µB > ∆µc
In terms of parameters H,K,F , the condition writes (1−F )H−FK > 0 or equivalently
H + K < H
F
. We also note that the combination of conditions H + K > 0 and C0
imply that H > 0. In the polar case in which projects are not correlated, equal
sharing enhances investments in technology A. Due to correlations between transfers,
correlated incomes affect the attractiveness of technology A9. Condition C0 guarantees
that the equilibrium risk level under full equal sharing exceeds the equilibrium risk
level of some isolated agent; i.e. xFES > xe∗. We assume that condition C0 holds
until the end of the article.
We extend the analysis to partial equal sharing. The typical case is that is which a
fixed proportion, say τ0, of incomes is collected and equally redistributed. Then, agent
i receives
(
1 − (n−1)
n
τ0
)
yi +
τ0
n
∑
j 6=i yj. Denoting λ0 = 1 − (n−1)n τ0, this sharing-rule
can be represented by the transfer matrix ΛPES(λ0) such that λ
PES
ii = λ0, for all i, and
λPESij =
1−λ0
n−1 , for all i, j 6= i (where ‘PES’ quotes for ‘Partial Equal Sharing’) - with
1−λ0
n−1 =
τ0
n
. Straightforward computation gives:
xPES(λ0) =
H +Kλ0
(1− F )λ0 + F (4)
Noticing that λ0 is a decreasing function of τ0, the equilibrium level of risk is decreasing
in the value of λ0. In particular, it is larger than the risk taken by an isolated agent.
In a word, in the context of egalitarian redistribution, more taxation implies more risk
sharing. This leads to an increase of risk taking.
9Suppose for instance that τA is high and τB low. Then, B may become more attractive and the
equilibrium levels of risk of socialized agents are lower than in isolation.
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We extend the analysis further to transfer matrices with heterogenous off-diagonal
elements. We thus define the family of transfer matrices with homogenous own shares
LHOS(λ0) = {Λ/λii = λ0,∀i}. A natural issue consists in ordering such matrices in
terms of their associated equilibrium risk profile. In fact, for any matrix Λ ∈ LHOS(λ0),
the equilibrium risk level is homogenous and only related to the own share of the matrix
Λ:
xHOS(λ0) =
H +Kλ0
(1− F )λ0 + F (5)
(this stems directly from equation (2), exploiting that Λ is row-stochastic) The following
proposition summarizes the results of the whole subsection:
Proposition 1 In societies with homogenous own shares, the equilibrium level of risk
is homogenous and decreasing in the value of own share. Furthermore, the equilibrium
level of risk exceeds that of isolated agents.
Proposition 1 confirms that for societies with homogenous own shares, more revenue
sharing enhances risk taking. We observe that, in societies with homogenous own
shares, risk level is only related to own share. However, profits depend on the whole
distribution of transfers. Let λ−i = (λi1, λi2, · · · , λii−1, λii+1, · · · , λin). We say that “the
distribution λ−i is more diversified than the profile λ′−i whenever
∑
j 6=i λ
2
ij >
∑
j 6=i λ
′2
ij”.
Then, it is easily shown that, when own shares are homogenous, more diversification
in the distribution λ−i is always beneficial to agent i’s equilibrium profit (proof are
available upon request). This means that agents are better off in the society with
transfer matrix ΛPES(λ0) than in any other society with the same homogenous own
share.
3.2 Risk sharing with heterogenous own shares
Until now, we considered risk sharing with homogenous own shares. We found that
risk levels are only affected by the value of own share, and we confirmed that more risk
sharing enhances risk taking, even in the presence of strategic interactions. We will
now focus on heterogenous risk sharing, and we will discuss the view that risk sharing
enhances risk taking.
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We separate the space of all bi-stochastic matrices in two complementary regions pa-
rameterized by F . We letR be the set of bi-stochastic matrices such that λii ∈
]
F
1+F
, 1
]
for all i, and R¯ be the set of bi-stochastic matrices such that for some i, λii ≤ F1+F .
We note that no own share is below one half in region R.
We consider a n × n matrix M with nonnegative elements mij, any column-vector
a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) with nonnegative real components and we let J denote the column
vector of ones. We define Ba(M ;α) as the solution of
(
I−αM)Ba = a, α ∈]−1, 1[ (we
write B(M ;α) if a = J). When both α > 0 and the greatest modulus of eigenvalues
of M is smaller than 1
α
, Ba(M ;α) can be interpreted as a vector of weighted (by a)
Bonacich centrality measure defined over the network with link mij representing the
intensity of the connection from agent i to agent j. Indeed,
Ba(M ;α) =
∞∑
k=0
αkMka (6)
is a well-defined quantity, and Bai (M ;α) measures the sum of the values of paths
from agent i to others through the network, where paths of length k toward agent
j are weighted by aj α
k (where the value of a path represents the product of link
intensities). This measure (actually, a slightly modified version) was introduced in
Bonacich (1987). Our model containing strategic substitutes, we will consider the case
α ∈]− 1, 0[. In such a case, the quantity given in equation (6) is also well-defined, but
the contribution of the network to the measure is ambiguous. Odd (resp. even) paths
contribute negatively (positively) to the measure.
Remark 1 Theorem 1, pp. 1408, in Ballester et al. (2006) provides a formulation
in terms of Bonacich centrality measure (i.e. a formulation using a positive decay
parameter) over another interaction matrix, under some restrictions of our game. We
choose not to use that formulation for two reasons. First, the specification is non
linear, making also difficult to interpret it. Second, our solutions are valid under less
restrictive environment than those required to obtain a positive decay parameter. We
will then speak about ‘Bonacich measure’, without reference to the notion of centrality10
10When the matrix of cross effects is binary, a centrality measure can be defined over its comple-
12
(we keep the reference to Bonacich, as it conveys the notion of network, and further
the measure is technically of same nature).
We define the vector D such that Di =
1
λ ii
. Inverting the linear system presented in
equation (2), we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1 A unique equilibrium X∗ = (I + FΓ)−1(HD +KJ) exists ‘almost every-
where’ in the space of admissible values of F . Furthermore, if Λ ∈ R, a unique solution
X∗ always exists and can be written
x∗i =
H
F
− (1− F )H − FK
F
Bi(Γ;−F ) (7)
for all i ∈ N , where Bi(Γ;−F ) is given by equation (6) and belongs to ]0, 1[.
We note that if own shares exceed one half, Bonacich measures are well defined11.
Equilibrium risk levels are lower than unity if H
F
≤ 1 (i.e. µA − µB < κ(τA − τAB)),
what we assume for simplicity.
Remark 2 In region R, inverting the system presented in equation (2), one expects a
characterization of equilibrium risk levels as a weighted Bonacich measure (since the
constant H + Kλii contains an idiosyncratic component). Theorem 1 expresses the
solution as a simple (non weighted) Bonacich measure. This is specific to the fact that
the constant is an affine function of λii and that the transfer matrix is row-stochastic
(the proof is in lemma 1).
A lesson of theorem 1 is that under weak risk sharing, interactions are sufficiently low
to guarantee that x∗i ∈]H+K, HF [. This means that in any society with transfer matrix
in R, every agent takes more risk at equilibrium than in isolation.
mentary matrix (an off-diagonal element of the complementary matrix is 1 if and only if the associate
element is 0 in the initial matrix) - see Corbo et al. (2007), Bramoulle´ et al. (2008), Bloch and Que´rou
(2008).
11Angelucci and De Giorgi show that “for every 100 pesos transferred by Progresa to the eligible
households, the consumption of ineligible households increases by approximately 11 pesos”. Since
the proportion of treated household is greater than one half, this suggests that own shares are high
proportions of revenues.
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We proceed to some comparative analysis of transfer matrices. Two issues emerge
when we try to replicate proposition 1 to societies with heterogenous own shares. First,
how to define more revenue sharing? We generalize the idea of ‘more revenue sharing’
as follows. Starting from any society, revenue sharing increases when all own shares are
diminished and no other share is diminished, in a way that preserves bi-stochasticity.
Formally:
Definition [more revenue sharing] Consider two transfer matrices Λ, Λ′ = Λ+Θ
such that for all i, θii = −
∑
j 6=i θij = −
∑
j 6=i θji. There is more revenue sharing in
matrix Λ′ than in Λ if for all i, θii ≤ 0 and for all i, j 6= i, θij ≥ 0.
Second, for societies with homogenous own shares, individual and average risk tak-
ing coincide. In opposite, risk levels are differentiated for societies with heterogenous
own shares. A natural question that arises is: does more revenue sharing always in-
crease individual risk taking, or eventually in average? The following theorem compares
the risk taking behaviors of two such societies12 in the region of weak risk sharing:
Theorem 2 Consider two transfer matrices Λ,Λ′ ∈ R. If there is more revenue shar-
ing in Λ′ than in Λ, then
∑
i x
′∗
i ≥
∑
i x
∗
i .
Theorem 2 confirms that more revenue sharing promotes risk taking in average in region
with weak risk sharing. Actually, more revenue sharing does not necessarily lead to
an increase of all individual risk levels. To illustrate, let Λ′ = Λ + Θ be such that
there is more revenue sharing in Λ′ than in Λ and such that θ1j = 0 for all j. Then,
combining first order equations applied to agent 1 in both matrices, one obtains easily
that there exists some agent, say i0, such that x
′∗
i0
< x∗i0 . Moreover, we note that, by
continuity, the result holds if there is strictly more revenue sharing in Λ′ than in Λ (we
just have to select a sufficiently small perturbation of the matrix Θ that yields θ11 < 0
12Comparing transfer matrices in which diagonal elements vary in opposite directions is difficult.
The point can be tackled by perturbing locally a society with homogenous own shares. We find that
any small modification, that induces an decrease of diagonal elements in average, leads to more risk
taking in average. Results are available upon request.
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while preserving both signs of all other terms and bi-stochasticity of the new transfer
matrix).
In the region with large risk sharing R¯, more revenue sharing may decrease risk
taking in average. Simple examples illustrate the problem in region R¯. Suppose H =
.5, K = 0, F = .9 and consider the following matrices: Λ =

.7 .08 .22
.12 .5 .38
.18 .42 .4
, Λ′ =

.6 .08 .32
.12 .5 .38
.28 .42 .3
. There is more revenue sharing in Λ′ than in Λ in the sense of the
above definition. We find x∗1 ' .499, x∗2 ' .496, x∗3 ' .578, implying 13
∑
i x
∗
i ' .5248;
and x′∗1 ' .692, x′∗2 ' .783, x′∗3 ' .097, entailing 13
∑
i x
′∗
i ' .5245. Hence, theorem 2
does not necessarily hold in region R¯. Furthermore, those two cases are such that
certain agents can take less risk than in isolation.
More, where we allowing values of xi /∈ [0, 1], what can be interpreted as short-selling,
the average level of risk itself may be lower than the risk taken in isolation. To illustrate,
suppose H = .1, K = 0, F = .9023 and consider Λ =

.65 .05 .3
.12 .5 .38
.23 .45 .32
. Noticing that
x∗e = .1, we find x
∗
1 ' .59, x∗2 ' .89, x∗3 ' −1.20, implying
∑
i x
∗
i ' 0.094.
Remark 3 When one of the two matrices Λ or Λ′ is homogenous, the theorem still
holds as soon as the other matrix lies in region R. Considering any transfer matrix
Λ ∈ R, we denote λ = mini λii, λ¯ = maxi λii, x = x∗(λ) and x¯ = x∗(λ¯). Then, x¯ ≤
1
n
∑
i x
∗
i ≤ x. A direct implication is that there exists a value λ0 ∈ [mini λii,maxi λii]
such that x∗(λ0) = 1n
∑
i x
∗
i . Furthermore, there exists at least one agent i0 (resp. j0)
with x∗i0 > x (resp. x
∗
j0
< x¯).
To sum up, fixing any transfer matrix in the region of weak risk sharing R, we
provide two broad sets of conditions under which the average level of risk taking is
enhanced by a (inequality preserving) modification of the structure of risk sharing.
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First, this occurs if the modification induces a decrease of all diagonal elements without
decreasing any non diagonal element, and such that the resulting matrix stays in region
R; second, this occurs if the modification induces a decrease of all diagonal elements
until some homogenous value not larger than the lowest own share of the former matrix,
irrespective of the structure of the modification out of the diagonal, and irrespective
of the locus of the resulting matrix (it can be in both regions).
The region of large risk sharing R¯ is more uncertain. Simple examples suggest that
the variance of risk levels is higher than in the region of weak risk sharing, and more
risk sharing can reduce risk taking; even the average risk level can be lower than the
optimal risk of an isolated agent.
4 Over- versus under-investment w.r.t. social wel-
fare
We consider the risk profiles that maximize the sum of profits in the society, W =
∑
i pii.
One particularity of the game is that the sign of externalities is endogenous. Indeed,
through the transfer of intensity λji, an increase in xi induces higher expected return
for agent j, but also higher variance13. In consequence, whether agents over- or under-
invest in the innovation with regard to social welfare is ambiguous. We will give some
partial answers, yet potentially instructive. In particular, the study suggests that the
structure of the transfer matrix is crucial to understand whether agents under- or
over-invest in technology A.
Let Ψ denote the matrix such that ψij =
∑
k λkiλkj for all i, j. We note that
ψij = ψji, and since the matrix Λ is bi-stochastic, the matrix Ψ is also bi-stochastic.
We also define the matrix Φ = [φij] such that φij = 0 for all i, φij =
ψij
ψii
for all i, j 6= i.
Finally, we define the vector E such that Ei =
1
ψ ii
. We remark that, being bi-stochastic,
the matrix Ψ associated with the transfer matrix Λ can be seen as a transfer matrix.
13Another originality of the model is that, due to covariances, the sign of the externality that agent
i’s risk level generates to agent j is related to the risk levels of all agents.
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Hence, we obtain:
Proposition 2 A unique efficient risk profile Xˆ = (I + FΦ)−1(HE + KJ) exists
‘almost everywhere’ in the space of admissible values of F . Furthermore, if Ψ ∈ R, a
unique solution Xˆ always exists and can be written
xˆi =
H
F
− (1− F )H − FK
F
Bi(Φ;−F ) (8)
for all i ∈ N , where Bi(Φ;−F ) is given by equation (6).
When the sign of externalities is constant, it is in general easy to see if agents under
invest or over invest with respect to social welfare. Here, since externalities may be
either positive or negative, it is difficult to find general conditions under which the
equilibrium risk profile either dominates or is dominated by the efficient profile. We
will provide two sets of conditions under which we can compare the average value of
efficient and equilibrium risk profiles.
Since the efficient risk profile corresponds to the transfer matrix of a modified game, the
conditions under which we were able, in the preceding section, to compare equilibrium
risk profiles associated to distinct transfer matrices basically hold. Hence, we obtain:
Proposition 3 Consider a matrix Λ ∈ R. The average equilibrium level of risk is
lower (resp. higher) than the average efficient level of risk if those three conditions
apply simultaneously: (i) Ψ ∈ R; (ii) λii ≥ ψii (resp. λii ≤ ψii) for all i; (iii) λij ≤ ψij
(resp. λij ≥ ψij) for all i, j 6= i.
Suppose now that Λ ∈ LHOS(λ0), and suppose that Ψ ∈ R. If λ0 ≥ maxi ψii (resp.
λ0 ≤ mini ψii), the average equilibrium level of risk is lower (resp. higher) than the
average efficient level of risk.
(proof omitted) Proposition 3 is the mirror of theorem 2 and remark 3 as applied to
efficiency issue. The proposition indicates that if matrix Ψ is the transfer matrix of a
game in which there is more (resp. less) revenue sharing than in the original game Λ,
then agents under-invest (resp. over-invest). Indeed, when agents increase their risk
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level, this has two opposite effects on the payoff of neighbors: this increases their risk,
but this also increases their expected return. Now, if agents do not exchange much
with the society, the expected return effect dominates, i.e. in average, agents do not
internalize that increasing their risk level would increase the overall expected return
of the society. Symmetrically, if agents exchange too much with the society, the risk
effect dominates, i.e. in average, agents do not internalize that decreasing their risk
level would reduce the overall risk of the society.
The condition specifying whether agents under- or over-invest in technology A is only
related to the transfer matrix. For instance, in the case of homogenous own shares, the
condition is simple, and it compares own shares with a diversification index. Noticeably,
under the reasonable condition λ0 >
1
2
, it turns out that λ0 > ψii for all i. That is,
agents under-invest with respect to societal view14.
To illustrate, we consider the following transfer matrix. We assume λii = λ0 for all
i, λij =
1−λ0
n−1 for all i, j 6= i. Then, own shares are homogenous, and social links are
maximally diversified, so ψii = ψ0 = λ
2
0 +
(1−λ0)2
n−1 for all i. An immediate observation
is that the efficient profile of payoffs is homogenous, and thus Pareto-dominates the
equilibrium profile. More, we note that λ0 > ψ0 iff λ0 >
1
n
. Applying the theorem, we
deduce the following results. First, if λ0 >
1
n
, and for ψ0 >
F
1+F
, which is probably
the most realistic case, the equilibrium level of risk is lower than the average efficient
level of risk. Second, if λ0 =
1
n
, the equilibrium risk profile coincides with the strong
efficient one, which is a good news once we have remark 4 in mind.
Remark 4 Suppose that we let agents fix by themselves the values of the transfers
without cost. Simple optimization induces that there is a unique equilibrium15. At this
equilibrium, it can be shown that all agents diversify their social links at maximum, i.e.
λ∗ij =
1
n
for all i, j. Further, it will be seen thereafter that this sharing-rule uniquely
satisfies that equilibrium risk coincides with that maximizing social welfare.
14This result provides a possible explanation of the lack of investment in risky innovations in devel-
oping villages (Valente [1997]).
15The proof is available upon request.
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5 Extension: cash transfers
Formal institutions can help developing villages by transferring Cash to households.
For Progresa program, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2008) document that part of this aid
is transferred by informal arrangements through the network and therefore also affects
the consumption of the non-treated16. Beyond consumption, and in direct filiation with
the main hypotheses of this article, we address the issue of the impact of Cash transfer
or wealth redistribution on the overall investments in technology A.
Suppose that an institution, interested in the promotion of technology A, uses
wealth redistribution or cash transfer as a policy tool. For simplicity, we will assume
that initial wealths are equal to 1 for all i17. A shock in wealths a = (a1, a2, · · · , an)
generates the new vector of wealths Ω˜ = (ω˜1, ω˜2, · · · , ω˜n) such that ω˜i = 1 + ai for all
i. Let zi = 1 · xi (resp. z˜i = ω˜i · xi) denote the amount of wealth that agent i invests
in technology A and Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) (resp. Z˜ = (z˜1, z˜2, · · · , z˜n)) the associated
profile. We let Z∗ (resp. Z˜∗) denote the equilibrium associated with wealth profile Ω
(resp. Ω˜).
The following proposition relates the variation of the part of wealths invested in tech-
nology A to the transpose of matrix Γ:
Proposition 4 Suppose that Λ ∈ R. The variation in the sum of equilibrium amounts
of wealths invested in technology A writes:∑
i
(
z˜∗i − z∗i
)
=
∑
i
ai
(
H
λii
+K
)
Bi(Γ
T ;−F ) (9)
16“Started in 1997 and still ongoing, Progresas aim is improving poor households education, health,
and nutrition through sizeable cash transfers. In our sample of rural villages, more than half of the
households are treated. The targeted villages are small and agriculture is the main, and often sole
economic activity. The exposure to natural disasters, the absence of formal credit and insurance
institutions, and extensive within-village kinship relationships create incentives to engage in informal
risk sharing activities. If this is the case, treated households will share part of their higher income
with members of their social network through gifts or loans. Therefore, the entire village will benefit
from the program.”
17Extending the analysis to heterogenous initial wealths, results are qualitatively unchanged (results
are available upon request).
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The institution aiming at promoting technology A should therefore take into account
the structure of the matrix Γ, and target certain households rather than others. As a
first illustration, we present a case in which the identity of eligible households is not
an issue. Suppose that own shares are homogenous, of value λ0:
Example 1: suppose that λ0 ∈
]
F
1+F
, 1
]
. Then variation in the sum of equilibrium
amounts of wealths invested in technology A writes as a function of the shocks on
wealths and the transfer matrix (proof in appendix):∑
i
(
z˜∗i − z∗i
)
= x∗(λ0)
∑
i
ai
One direct implication is that the amount of cash transfer matters, not the identity
of eligible agents. A second implication in that the magnitude of the impact of the
wealth shock on investments in technology A is related to x∗(λ0), the equilibrium level
of risk of a society with homogenous own shares of value λ0; precisely, x
∗(λ0) is the
proportion of cash transfer that will be allocated to technology A.
Example 2: this example shows that, in general, risk sharing heterogeneity makes
the task of targeting eligible households adequately not obvious. Suppose that Cash
transfer is given to a unique agent i0; i.e., ai0 = 1 > 0 and aj = 0 for all j 6= i0. The
induced variation in the sum of wealths invested in the risky technology writes:(
H
λi0i0
+K
)
Bi0(Γ
T ;−F ) (10)
Hence, if one agent is given cash transfer, an institution that would aim at maximizing
the investment in the (more) risky technology should give the transfer to the agent
who maximizes expression (10). That agent needs not coincide with that investing the
maximal amount at X∗.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a model of risk choice in the presence of heterogenous risk sharing
and strategic interactions. To focus on pure risk sharing, our model considers agents
with homogenous initial wealth, homogenous expected ‘after transfer wealth’, and same
risk aversion.
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We first point out that solutions generally exist and are unique. In particular, when
risk sharing is not too large, optimal risk levels are linearly related to the Bonacich
measures of a slight transformation of the transfer matrix.
When risk sharing is not too large, the common view that more risk sharing entails
more risk taking is preserved, although only in average. Further, simple statistics over
the composition of transfers indicate whether agents over- or under-invest with regard
to the efficient allocation. Last, the analysis has important policy implications. For
instance, we characterize how to select adequately eligible households for cash transfer
or which wealth redistributions is opportune, in order to increase investments in the
more profitable/risky technology.
When risk sharing is large, i.e. when risk sharing is voluminous, simple examples
illustrate that the combination of strategic interactions and heterogeneity can destroy
all the results: the average risk level may be reduced by an increase of transfers, and
more, it may be even lower than the risk chosen by an isolated agent.
It would be interesting to test the theoretical predictions of this simple model.
Moreover, some lines of research should deserve attention: relating the formation of
risk sharing rules to wealth and correlated risks, to the nature of risks (health vs
incomes shocks), to the interplay between risk sharing and other activities aimed at
insuring against volatility (savings, extra income earnings).
APPENDIX
Definition 1 (Strict diagonal-dominance) A n × n matrix M = [mij] is strictly
diagonal-dominant if |mii| >
∑
j 6=i |mij| for all i.
Definition 2 (row-stochasticity) A n × n matrix M = [mij] is row-stochastic if
mij ∈ R+ for all i, j and
∑n
j=1mij = 1 for all i.
Preliminary result 1 If a n×n matrix M is strictly diagonal-dominant, the equation
MZ = J admits a unique solution.
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Lemma 1 Consider three parameters δ ∈]0, 1[, α ∈ R, β ∈ R, such that α 1−δ
δ
6= β.
Consider also a n × n row-stochastic matrix A = [aij] such that aii > δ1+δ for all i.
Define E = [eij], with eii = 0 for all i and eij =
aij
aii
for all i, j 6= i. The system of
equations such that, for all i,
aiixi + δ
∑
j 6=i
aijxj = α + βaii (11)
admits a unique solution
xi =
α
δ
−
(
α
1− δ
δ
− β
)
Bi(E;−δ) (12)
with Bi(E;−δ) ∈]0, 1[.
Proof of lemma 1. We consider the following transformation:
vi =
(
1
α 1−δ
δ
− β
)(
α
δ
− xi
)
(13)
Equation (11) becomes:
aii
(
α
F
− (α1− δ
δ
− β)vi)+ δ∑
j 6=i
aij
(
α
F
− (α1− δ
δ
− β)vj) = α + βaii (14)
Dividing all terms by aii, and taking account of
∑
j 6=i aij = 1− aii, one obtains:
vi + δ
∑
j 6=i
eijvj = 1 (15)
or in matrix form (I+ δE)V = J . Since aii >
δ
1+δ
for all i, the matrix I+ δE is strictly
diagonal-dominant. The preliminary result 1 applies with M = I + δE.
Inverting the system, the solution writes as a Bonacich measure vi = Bi(E;−δ) with
B(E;−δ) = ∑∞k=0(−δ)kEkJ . Rearranging,
B(E;−δ) = I(I − δE)J + (δE)2(I − δE)J + (δE)4(I − δE)J + · · · (16)
Factorizing, one obtains:
B(E;−δ) =
( ∞∑
k=0
δ2kE2k
)
· (I − δE)J (17)
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Notice that δ2k[E2k]ij > 0 for all k, i, j. Further, if aii >
δ
1+δ
for all i, the vector
(I − δE)J > 0. Hence, B(E;−δ) > 0. More, note that a solution of (I + δE)Z = J
also writes Z = J − δEZ. That is, if Z > 0, clearly Z < J . 
Proof of theorem 1. The matrix with diagonal element λii and non diagonal ele-
ments Fλij represents the system of first order conditions. We note that the system
is invertible ‘almost everywhere’ in terms of the parameter F ; indeed, the determinant
of the system is a polynomial expression of degree not higher than n in parameter
F . Hence, fixing the matrix of transfers, there exists at most n values of parameter
F ∈ [0, 1] for which the system is not invertible. If this matrix is diagonal-dominant
(which is the condition on own shares given in the theorem), the system is invertible.
This guarantees that the solution is unique, and more, Bonacich measures are well
defined.
Since the transfer matrix is row-stochastic, the equation 2 becomes:
λiix
∗
i + F
∑
j 6=i
λij · x∗j = H +Kλii (18)
Hence, we can apply lemma 1 with δ = F , α = H, β = K, A = Λ. Note that in this
case α 1−δ
δ
> β by condition C0. 
Proof of theorem 2. We use the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (adapted from Farkas’s lemma) Let Q be an n×n matrix. If the equa-
tion QTx = J admits a positive solution, then for all y ∈ Rn such that Qy ≥ 0, we
have
∑
i yi ≥ 0.
We let matrix ΛF denote the matrix with diagonal element λii and non-diagonal ele-
ments Fλij. We will see that the conditions of the lemma apply if we fix Q = ΛF and
y = x′∗ − x∗:
First, we prove that there exists a positive solution to (ΛF )
Tx = J :
The condition writes:
λiixi + F
∑
j 6=i
λjixj = 1 (19)
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Since the matrix Λ is bi-stochastic, the matrix ΛT is row-stochastic. We can therefore
apply lemma 1 with δ = F , α = 1, β = 0, A = ΛT , and we conclude that there is a
positive solution to the system (ΛF )
Tx = J .
Second, we see that ΛF (x
′∗ − x∗) ≥ 0:
Indeed, we observe that [Λ′Fx]
′∗
i = H +K(λii + θii), and ΛFx
′∗ = Λ′Fx
′∗ −Θx′∗. Then,
[ΛFx
′∗]i = H +K(λii + θii)− [ΘFx′∗]i. Hence,
[ΛF (x
′∗ − x∗)]i = Kθii − (θiix′∗i + F
∑
j 6=i
θijx
′∗
j ) (20)
Since the matrix Λ′ ∈ R, theorem 1 implies that H +K < x′∗i < HF for all i. Recalling
that all θij > 0, x
′∗
i + F
∑
j 6=i
θij
θii
x′∗j > H + K + H
∑
j 6=i
θij
θii
. Since
∑
j 6=i
θij
θii
= −1,
x′∗i + F
∑
j 6=i
θij
θii
x′∗j > K and we are done.
Third, we apply lemma 2 and conclude that∑
i
(x− x∗i ) ≥ 0 (21)
which proves the theorem. 
Proof of proposition 2. Simple computation entails:
1
κ
∂W
∂xi
=
µA − µB
κ
+ (σ2B − τAB)
∑
j
λ2ji − (τA + τB − 2τAB)
∑
j
λji
∑
k 6=i
λjkxk
+(τB − τAB)
∑
j
λji
∑
k 6=i
λjk − (σ2A + σ2B − 2τAB)xi
∑
j
λ2ji (22)
That is, ∂W
∂xi
= 0 if and only if
ψiixˆi + F
∑
j 6=i
ψijxˆj = H +Kψii (23)
Since the matrix Λ is bi-stochastic,
∑
j 6=i ψij = 1 − ψii; that is, the matrix Ψ is row-
stochastic. We can therefore apply lemma 1 with δ = F , α = H, β = K, A = Ψ
(and thus E = Φ). In particular, ψii >
F
1+F
for all i implies that the matrix I + FΦ is
strictly diagonal-dominant. 
24
Proof of proposition 4. From the first order condition given by equation (2), we
obtain:  λiiz∗i + F
∑
j 6=i λijz
∗
j = H +Kλii
λiiz˜
∗
i + F
∑
j 6=i λij z˜
∗
j = (1 + ai)
(
H +Kλii
) (24)
Thus,
z˜∗i − z∗i + F
∑
j 6=i
γij(z˜
∗
j − z∗j ) = ai
(
H
λii
+K
)
(25)
Defining vector e such that ei =
ai
λii
, we find in matrix form:
(I + FΓ)(Z˜∗ − Z∗) = He+Ka (26)
Denoting T = (I + FΓ)−1, and summing all terms of the vector, we find:∑
i
(
z˜∗i − z∗i
)
= H
∑
i
∑
j
Tij
aj
λjj
+K
∑
i
∑
j
Tijaj (27)
That is: ∑
i
(
z˜∗i − z∗i
)
= H
∑
j
aj
λjj
∑
i
Tij +K
∑
j
aj
∑
i
Tij (28)
Remind that Bi(Γ;−F ) =
∑
j Tij. Now, since Λ ∈ R, we can develop matrix T in its
series:
Bi(Γ
T ;−F ) =
∑
j
(
(I + FΓT )−1
)
ij
=
∑
j
∞∑
k=0
F k(ΓTij)
k =
∑
j
∞∑
k=0
F k((Γij)
k)T
=
∑
j
( ∞∑
k=0
F k(Γij)
k
)T
=
∑
j
(
(I + FΓ)−1ij
)T
=
∑
j
(I + FΓ)−1ji =
∑
i
Tij
That is,
Bi(Γ
T ;−F ) =
∑
i
Tij (29)
and we are done. 
Proof of the result in example 1. Equation (25) writes:
λii(z˜
∗
i − z∗i ) + F
∑
j 6=i
λij(z˜
∗
j − z∗j ) = ai
(
H +Kλii
)
(30)
25
summing over all agents and taking account of the fact that the matrix of transfers is
row-stochastic, one obtains:
F
∑
i
(
z˜∗i − z∗i
)
+ (1− F )
∑
i
λii
(
z˜∗i − z∗i
)
= H
∑
i
ai +K
∑
i
λiiai
Taking account that λii = λ0 for all i, the corollary follows. 
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